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Abstract
Unemployment may depend on equilibrium in other markets than the labor markets.
This paper adresses this old idea by introducing search frictions on several markets:
in a model of credit and labor market imperfections as in Wasmer and Weil (2004), I
further introduce search on the goods market. The model can be solved by blocks: on
two of the three markets, the relevant "market tightness" is a constant of parameters.
In particular, goods market tightness, expressed as the ratio of unmatched consumers
to unmatched firms, is equal to 1 which corresponds to a stochastic Say’s law: demand
and supply are stochastically in equilibrium. Financial market tightness is also a func-
tion of three parameters related to financial frictions. Job creation and employment
depend on the equilibrium in the other markets. Reciprocally, higher job destruction
implies more volatility of income of individual consumers and higher destruction of con-
sumption matches. This lowers profits and further reduces job creation. Finally, there
are complementarities between frictions in each market: in particular, the marginal
eﬀect of financial frictions on equilibrium unemployment is amplified by goods market
frictions and vice versa.
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1 Introduction
This paper is an attempt to model the steady-state of an economy with several
search markets in general equilibrium interactions. Trade in every explicit mar-
ket (in this paper, markets for labor, for credit and for final goods) is represented
by a market-specific matching function. The goal is to study the properties of
such an economy: we look for "theoretical regularities" such as the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium; block recursiveness in solutions, that is, whether the
model can be solved first for some markets and then for the other markets inde-
pendently; the size and determinants of accelerators in response to profit shocks;
the impact of sequential bargaining on price/wage/interest rate determination
and in particular strategic rent extraction.
The paper exhibits some similarities with the tradition of Walrasian general
equilibrium theory. This theory and extensions to security markets provide a
rich and elegant analysis of markets in complete (general equilibrium) interac-
tion: as put in Tirole (1988), "the best-developed and most aesthetically pleasing
model in the field of economics is the competitive-equilibrium paradigm of Arrow-
Debreu. (...) Weak assumptions about preferences and technological possibilities
yield general results on competitive equilibrium". The first and second welfare
theorems are powerful, and most properties hold even in the presence of uncer-
tainty, at least under the assumption of a suﬃciently large number of security
markets.
Yet, despite the general equilibrium theory’s elegance and simplicity, it has
fragile foundations. Many assumptions are unrealistic: agents are not all atom-
istic, they are far from being perfectly informed, transferring goods and pro-
duction inputs from one place to another is often costly; and contrary to the
Arrow-Debreu securitization assumptions, most future markets are inexistant.
In spite of providing an inaccurate description of the real world, the norma-
tive implications of general equilibrium results have shaped policy debates for
decades.
This paper deviates away from the general equilibrium theory in developing
a stylized model of a "multi-frictional" economy with three markets (credit,
labor and goods). An important assumption made here is that agents cannot
consume alone their own output, as in Diamond (1982a), and Kiyotaki and
Wright (1993), and instead rely on other agents to consume (consumer search)
or to generate profits (firm search). Those “other agents” cannot be located,
unless incurring some search eﬀort. The goal is obviously not to be perfectly
realistic: it is only to be more realistic than general equilibrium theory. We
are motivated by the need of a simple alternative theory of general equilibrium,
even if this paper is still a very preliminary step in this direction.
The equilibrium of this model can be easily characterized by three "mar-
ket tightnesses" and three prices, solved by two free-entry conditions and one
inelastic labor supply condition, and bargaining equations over the surplus or
rigid wage/price. Whatever the assumptions about price/wage determination
(exogeneity or bargaining), we find a convenient way of solving the model by
blocks: credit and goods market tightness are expressed as a simple constant of
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parameters, as well as prices. Further, goods market tightness is even equal to
1 in steady-state. When it exists, we prove uniqueness of the equilibrium; we
obtain that the economy is relatively more reactive to profit shocks when there
are more market imperfections, through the spillovers from credit and goods
market on the labor market; that the eﬀects of frictions tend to be complement
to each other; that credit frictions play quantitatively a larger role than the
frictions on other markets; and that two sets of agents bargaining first extract
a rent on the other agents.
In a companion paper, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer explore the dynamic
implications of a variant of the model, with some diﬀerences in particular in
wage bargaining, in the specification of search eﬀort by consumers and in the
allocation of income in the economy. It turns out that the static and the dynamic
properties of the model are very diﬀerent from each other: in conclusion, we
provide a discussion of the additional features brought by the dynamics of the
model.
In Section 2, we review the literature and discuss the link between the
early neo-keynesian models and matching models; in Section 3, we develop
the labor and credit market, introduce free-entry conditions and derive some
useful equilibrium conditions. In Section 4, we introduce the goods market,
establish the equilibrium value of goods market tightness as the solution of
a fixed point problem, and finally solve for price and wages. In Section 5, we
study the comparative statics of the equilibrium and provide numerical exercises
in order to measure the volatility of economies to shocks in diﬀerent scenarios
regarding market frictions. Section 6 provides a parametrization and computes
multipliers of profit shocks. Section 7 then relaxes two assumptions, first that
firms and bankers do not consume, second that the unemployed cannot consume.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Some related literature
Introducing deviations from the assumptions of competitive markets within a
general equilibrium framework has been a central research agenda for many
years. In an earlier work, Prescott and Townsend (1984) made an important
step in expanding the general equilibrium theory with several asymmetries of
information: their purpose was "to explore the extent to which standard, general
equilibrium analysis of Pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied
to economies with moral hazard and adverse selection problems." Introducing
lotteries to smooth decision rules, they are able to show that moral hazard does
not undo the optimality theorems, while in economies with adverse selection in
insurance markets and signaling economies, the second theorem may not apply.
Another strand of research with a more explicitly macroeconomic focus is
the Keynesian tradition under fixed prices and the neo-keynesian tradition un-
der imperfectly competitive goods markets. Bénassy (1982, 1986) in particular
developed the macroeconomic theory of disequilibrium in worlds of rigid prices.
In Bénassy (1993), he showed a simple example of a fixed price/flexible wage
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economy where "...unemployment in the labor market is due entirely to the mal-
functioning of the goods market! Of course this is an example but we must keep
in mind the extreme importance of the interactions across markets, which is a
major reason why a full general equilibrium analysis is needed." (Bénassy 1993,
p. 735). Subsequent contributions attempted to introduce endogenous price
determination with imperfectly competitive product markets.
Another issue encountered in the Keynesian tradition was to provide a good
description of who consumes and who does not consume, that is, an explicit
rationing scheme at the microeconomic level. Indeed, under disequilibrium, not
everybody can trade with each other. Some agents will consume, others will not.
As shown in Bénassy (1993, pp. 736 to 747), in most cautious theoretical work
of that tradition, some complexity arises from the need to precisely define nom-
inal and eﬀective demands and supplies of goods. In particular, there are two
central questions that need answers: how can the numerous signals expressed
by agents about their desired consumption levels be transformed into eﬀective
transactions, and how do these transformations make consistent the large set
of nominal demands and supplies of each individual, through the assumption of
an aggregate function of signals.
In our paper, the markets are non-walrasian, but for other reasons than
imperfect price adjustment. We start by relaxing the central assumption of
the existence of centralized markets and "introduce costly delays in the pro-
cess of finding trading partners and determining the terms of trade" as stated
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999, p. 2569) for instance, along the lines of
the search-and-matching literature. An important building block, following the
pioneering work by Diamond (1981, 1982a, b), Mortensen (1982a,b), Pissarides
(1984) is that the number of trading agents is governed by a smooth and well-
behaved aggregate matching function, the input of which are the number of
agents willing to trade.1
Quite interestingly, the way the early search-and-matching literature defines
the aggregate function of signals of agents (Bénassy 1993) is very reminiscent
of the way Pissarides (1990, chapter 1) rationalizes the aggregate matching
function: he sees it as a technology that makes consistent the desired demand
and desired supply side of markets. One can reinterpret Bénassy’s signals of
required consumption/supply as being the elements of the "vacancy" side of
markets (that is how many and by how much agents are willing to trade) to link
the neo-keynesian tradition and the general equilibrium matching approach.
The matching approach oﬀers several advantages over the traditional neo-
keynesian literature. It shares some virtues with competitive equilibrium theory
(CET hereafter), i.e. simplicity of the solutions, elegance of the models allowing
1 The other building blocks of search theory used here are: i) economic agents are not fully
informed and in particular collect information about trading opportunities or quality of goods
at random times; ii) a corollary of the previous block is that economic agents trade randomly,
after irregular contacts; iii) a natural implication of the previous two blocks is that trade is
priced diﬀerently from the competitive view of the world: subject to bilateral contacts, agents
engage in a negotiation about how to split surpluses. Nash-bargaining solutions are therefore
basic building blocks of this theory.
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to express the main intuitions easily, convenient ways of introducing intertem-
poral trade-oﬀs and investigation of the dynamics of macroeconomic variables.
It also encompasses the frictionless general equilibrium theory as a limit case,
when matching occurs at an infinitely high rate. Nesting CET, it must nec-
essarily be the case that matching models are a better description of the real
world than CET, over a range of matching parameters. Second, matching the-
ory rationalizes the existence of vacancies, such as vacant job positions, vacant
housing, unmatched capital units and unused money holdings.
It is therefore no surprise that the search and matching approach to labor
markets has become central in both quantitative macroeconomics and in labor
economics. What is somewhat a surprise is that it has not been used more to
expand the neo-keynesian agenda, namely: i) to investigate the general equi-
librium interactions between markets (what Bénassy calls "spillovers between
markets"); ii) to identify causes of unemployment outside the labor markets.
One may thus expect matching theory to be a good starting point for the de-
velopment of alternative general equilibrium theories. As a matter of fact; quite
many contributions have attempted to model diﬀerent markets with search or
matching tools: for instance, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) have modeled money
in this way, Wheaton (1990) has adapted it for housing markets.2 Other papers
have explored similar assumptions with interactions between frictional markets.
Bertensen, Menzio and Wright (2011) study a money-search economy and labor
frictions. Their framework allows them to discuss monetary policy, inflation and
interest rates and their eﬀect on unemployment. Lehmann and Van der Linden
(2010) have also introduced frictions in good and labor markets. They focus
more on normative implications of search frictions and of inflation.
3 The structure and equilibrium of the model
The structure adapts and extends that of Wasmer and Weil (2004, WW here-
after). There are three types of agents: workers, who need to employed by a
firm to produce, entrepreneurs/firms who need a worker to produce output, but
cannot hire and sell immediately and private banks. Entrepreneurs need to pay
their employees before selling, and for that need to borrow from the bank. The
bank is a profit maximizing unit that is refinanced by a fourth (absent) agent,
the Central Bank, at some discount factor r. The bank will deliver a particular
financial contract to the entrepreneur; the important point is that the bank sup-
plies liquidity to the entrepreneur as long as needed, and receives in exchange
a predetermined part of future profits.
All agents are risk-neutral ; they have the same discount rate of the future
r as the one defined by the Central Bank’s interest rate (in continuous time).
Another helpful assumption is that all contracts between agents can be enforced
2 As stated in Rogerson et al. (2005), "At the outset, it is important to point out that
search theory constitutes a very large branch of economics. In addition to labor it has been
used in many applications in both micro and macro, including monetary theory, industrial
organization, finance, and the economics of the marriage market (...)"
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and they all expire after the arrival of a shock destroying the technology of the
firm.
Hence, what we call a bank is actually only a (profit-maximizing) supplier
of liquidity that allows entrepreneurs to finance two activities, first the hiring
activities and second the search for consumers. This is a very stylized money
market, and we do not enter the detail of its functioning, in contrast to the
seminal paper by Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Further, following Wasmer and
Weil and in contrast to Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) or Diamond (1982a), we
assume that agents are not able to store any value, even their own production:
workers, who are also consumers, do not save (bank notes will burn sponta-
neously) and all produced goods fully depreciate when they are not sold: goods
are like butter, not like guns. Therefore, banks are the only agents allowing to
transmit value across time and thus permit the functioning of the economy.
3.1 Firms and the goods market
There are four periods in the lifetime of a firm: in period 0, it searches a banker.
In period 1, it looks for a worker. In period 2, it produces but cannot store the
good, and simultaneously looks for a consumer. In period 3, it sells the good,
receives a price in return and finally pays a predetermined amount to the bank
- that will have been negotiated between them in the beginning of period 1, at
the time of their meeting.
Let E0, E1, E2 and E3 the respective steady-state asset values of a firm in
each period. We have:
rE0 = −c+ p(E1 − E0) (1)
rE1 = −γ + γ + q(E2 − E1) (2)
rE2 = −w + w + λ(E3 − E2) + s(E0 − E2) (3)
rE3 = P − w − ρ+ s(E0 − E3) + τ(E2 − E3) (4)
where p is the Poisson rate at which a banker is found; γ is the hiring cost per
period of time that is financed by the banker (hence the firm’s cash-flow is zero
in period 1; q is the Poisson rate at which the firm hires; w is the wage paid
to the worker, financed by the bank in period 2; λ is the Poisson rate at which
the firm finds a consumer; P is the selling price; ρ is the payment contracted
with the bank in the beginning of stage 1; s is the rate of obsolescence of
the good/technology, which strikes in both period 2 and 3 and τ is the rate at
which the consumer stops buying the production, and measures the versatility of
consumers; τ will actually not be a parameter, but the result of some exogenous
income shock, specified later on. When the shock τ occurs, the firms revert to
state 2: the firm preserves its past contractual arrangement and does survive,
though at a lower value of expected profits. It only keeps its worker, and the
bank pays for the wage.3 Finally, c is the flow disutility of the firm in stage 0
3 Note that the timing of events is important: the firm has to search for a bank first, then for
a worker, then for a customer. We do not allow for a reversal in the order worker/customer.
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and can be interpreted as the eﬀort cost made to convince a banker to finance
future negative cash-flows.
The parameter λ reflects frictions in the goods market, that is implicitly a
combination of two factors: first, it reflects how heterogeneous the consumers
are (see Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001 and Lagos 2000 for a discussion of how
heterogeneity and dispersion in space provide foundations to matching), and
second, it reflects the degree of imperfect competition on the goods market. We
will examine later on what lies behind λ and its impact on wages and prices.4
3.2 Matching between banks and starting firms
We follow the matching literature and state that the total number of con-
tacts is governed by a matching technology associating the number of banks
in stage 0 denoted by B0 and the number of firms in stage 0 denoted by N0.
Let MC(N0,B0) be the matching process in the credit market. We have that
p = MC(N0,B0)/N0. Symmetrically, the Poisson rate at which banks find a
project they are willing to finance is MC(N0,B0)/B0 = φp where φ = N0/B0.
It follows that φ is a natural measure of the tightness of the credit market and,
under the assumption of constant returns to scale ofMC(·,·), that p = p(φ) with
p￿(φ) < 0 and elasticity ε(φ) = −p￿(φ)/φp(φ). We also make Inada assumptions
that
lim
φ→0
p(φ) = +∞
lim
φ→+∞
p(φ) = 0
The first line states that, in the relative scarcity of competing firms relative to
banks, matching with a banker is instantaneous, and the second line states that
in the relative abundance of competing firms relative to banks, matching with
a banker is infinitely slow.
3.3 Banks and liquidity
As said above, banks are refinanced by the Central Bank at a rate r. They are
in one of four states: looking for projects to finance, financing job search and
wages in stages 1 and 2 of the firm, finally enjoying the repayment in stage 3.
Denoting by κ the cost of screening projects, we obtain the Bellman equations
It may indeed be possible or desirable for the customer to wait for production to occur. This
is a situation which is encountered by consumers of specific good such as “Rolls Royce” or
“Jaguar”, that are ordered and paid and then only delivered after several months. The same is
true for new housing. For most other goods, our sequencing assumption is more plausible. In
contrast, reversing the sequencing with respect to credit is impossible, as firms need liquidity
to proceed to subsequent stages, hiring or advertising the goods.
4 This specification for search frictions in the goods market is a variant of the traditional
money search literature, e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), where the probability to meet
a trading partner is the square of the underlying probability for one side to agree on the
exchange. The square reflects the double coincidence of goods.
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for the banks in steady-state:
rB0 = −κ+ φp(B1 −B0) (5)
rB1 = −γ + q(B2 −B1) (6)
rB2 = −w + λ(B3 −B2) + s(B0 −B2) (7)
rB3 = ρ+ s(B0 −B3) + τ(B2 −B3) (8)
In line 2 (stage 1), the bank finances the hiring costs and in line 3 (stage
2), the bank finances the wage, as long as the firm searches for a consumer. As
previously, when the consumer quits the firm, the bank is back in stage 2 and
still finances the wage costs. Banks are the key operator here: they transform
the liquidity provided to them by the Central Bank into firm investment such
as job creation and hiring.
3.4 Matching between firms and workers
Similarly to the credit market, we assume that the total number of contacts is
governed by a matching technology associating the number of firms in stage 1
(that is, of vacancies) denoted by V and the total number of workers looking for
a job. Since we rule out on-the-job search for simplicity, the number of workers
looking for a job is simply the number of unemployed, denoted U .
Let ML(V,U) be the matching process in the credit market. We have that
q = ML(V,U)/V. Symmetrically, the Poisson rate at which workers would find a
firm is ML(V,U)/U = θq where θ = V/U . Then, θ is a measure of the tightness
of the labor market. We also assume constant returns to scale of ML(·,·), and
therefore q = p(θ) with q￿(θ) < 0 and elasticity η(θ) = −q￿(θ)/θp(θ). We also
make Inada assumptions that
lim
θ→0
q(θ) = +∞
lim
θ→+∞
q(θ) = 0
The first line states that, in the relative scarcity of competing vacancies relative
to the unemployed workers, matching with a worker is instantaneous, and the
second line states that in the relative abundance of competing vacancies relative
to workers, matching with a worker is infinitely slow.
3.5 Implications of free entry
We assume free entry of firms and banks. That, is
B0 = 0 (9)
E0 = 0 (10)
This leads to the following useful intermediate steps: by diﬀerence of E3 and
E2 we obtain that
(E3 − E2)(r + λ+ τ + s) = P − w − ρ (11)
(B3 −B2)(r + λ+ τ + s) = ρ+ w (12)
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An important notation for what follows is the ratio of transition rates αλ where
αλ =
r + s+ λ
r + s+ λ+ τ
This ratio goes from its maximum (r + s)/(r + s + τ) when λ tends to zero
(infinite amount of frictions on the goods market) to 1 when λ tends to infinity
(frictionless goods market) or alternatively when consumers never stop consum-
ing (τ=0). In other words, when the goods market becomes unfriendly to firms
(consumers diﬃcult to locate or more versatile), αλ gets closer to 0. It is thus
a summary indicator of fluidity in the goods market.
We have the following useful equations:
B1 =
κ
φp(φ)
(13)
E1 =
c
p(φ)
(14)
B3 =
ραλ − w(1− αλ)
r + s
(15)
E3 = αλ
P − w − ρ
r + s
(16)
The first two equations come from the free-entry of banks and firms and
state that the value of a match for the bank (respectively the firm) in stage 1 is
the expected value of search costs for the bank (respectively the firm). The next
two equations combine the asset values of banks (respectively firms) in stage 2
and 3 and provide a calculation of the expected value of streams of revenues for
each side (bank and firm).
We also report intermediate steps linking the asset values across diﬀerent
periods together, to simplify future derivations of the equilibrium. In particular:
B2 =
1
r + s+ λ
[−w + λB3] (17)
E2 =
1
r + s+ λ
[0 + λE3] (18)
B1 =
1
r + q(θ)
[−γ + qB2] (19)
E1 =
1
r + q(θ)
[0 + qE2] (20)
3.6 Credit bargaining
The terms of repayment from the firm to the bank are denoted by the flow
valueρ. It is the outcome of a bargaining process, and set so as to maximize
(B1 −B0)β (E1 − E0)1−β (21)
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where β is the bargaining power of the bank. We derive the outcome of bar-
gaining under the important assumption that wages and prices, endogenously
and determined later on, are however independent of the repayment ρ. This
condition will actually be verified and proved ex-post, in Section 4.3 (Property
6). Thanks to this assumption, and to the free entry conditions, we easily obtain
the values of B1 and E1, combining the free-entry conditions (13), (14) and the
bargaining equation(21):
Property 1 (block recursiveness 1) (Wasmer and Weil, 2004). The equi-
librium credit market tightness is only a function of parameters of the financial
market. It does not depend on goods market frictions:
φ∗ =
1− β
β
κ
c
(22)
Now, thanks to the recursive structure, we also have the forward solutions to
the Bellman equations in stage 15 allowing us to conveniently solve for ρ thanks
again to equation (21):
Flow repayment ρ from the firm to the bank in profit stage 3:
αλ
ρ
r + s
= β
￿
P − w
r + s
￿
+ (1− β)
￿
γ
q(θ)
r + s+ λ
λ
+
w
λ
+
w(1− αλ)
r + s
￿
(25)
The interpretation of equation (25) is as follows: the expected value of repayment
is αλ ρr+s , and would be
ρ
r+s if consumers never changed taste (τ = 0 implying
αλ = 1). This expected repayment is simply a weighted average of future profits
properly discounted P−wr+s and of costs borne by the bank: namely, the future
value of start-up costs γq(θ) and all labor costs supported by the bank during
stage 2.
The fact that goods market are imperfect (lower λ) lowers αλ leading to
higher financial repayment to the bank. In the limit case without frictions in
the goods market, the repayment would then be, as in Wasmer and Weil (2004):
ρ
r + s
= β
￿
P − w
r + s
￿
+ (1− β)
￿
γ
q(θ)
￿
(26)
Overall, repayment here is higher than that for two reasons: a) there is a
scale eﬀect due to αλ < 1 in the left-hand side; and b) by definition of the role
5 Intermediate steps are to replace the values of B3 and E3 into B2 and E2 and then replace
them all into equations (19) and (20) to obtain:
E1 =
q(θ)
r + q(θ)
λ
r + s+ λ
αλ
P − w − ρ
r + s
(23)
B1 =
q(θ)
r + q(θ)
￿ −γ
q(θ)
+
λ
r + s+ λ
￿
−w
λ
+
ραλ − w(1− αλ)
r + s
￿￿
(24)
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of banks, they have to support labor costs during the search of consumers by
firms. Hence the additional burden for banks described by wλ +
w(1−αλ)
r+s which
once again only disappears when λ goes to infinity. A more compact way of
expressing ρ is to introduce a notation Bw:
αλ
ρ
r + s
= β
￿
P − w
r + s
￿
+ (1− β)
￿
γ
q(θ)
r + s+ λ
λ
+Bw
￿
(27)
where
Bw =
w
λ
+
w(1− αλ)
r + s
Property 2 (Partial complementarity between financial and goods
markets). The lower λ (hence, the more frictions on the goods market), the
higher the expected financial burden of the firm, represented by αλρ, because
banks require a higher repayment if it takes more time for the firm to make
profits. Note also that ∂(αλρ)/∂(1/λ) > 0 is higher when the bargaining power
of the bank (1−β) is itself higher. Finally, a lower λ leads to a larger repayment
ρ.
Proof: Diﬀerentiate equation (27) using ∂(1−αλ)∂(1/λ) =
τλ2
(r+s+λ+τ)2 hence
∂Bw
∂(1/λ) =
w
￿
1 + τλ
2
(r+s+λ+τ)2(r+s)
￿
and ∂
r+s+λ
λ
∂(1/λ) = r+s, hence the derivative calculated above.
On the second point,
1
r + s
∂(ραλ)
∂(1/λ)
= (1− β)
￿
γ(r + s)
q(θ)
+ w
￿
1 +
τλ2
(r + s+ λ+ τ)2(r + s)
￿￿
On the last point, given that αλ is itself increasing with λ, more goods market frictions
are associated with a lower αλ. Combined with the first part of the proposition, more
goods market frictions imply higher repayment.
This happens to be the first of a relatively frequent result in the economics
of "multi-frictional economies": imperfections in each market tend to reinforce
each other. This is a partial equilibrium result, not a general equilibrium result
yet. It has however an intuitive appeal: the present discounted value (PDV)
of firm’s future profits is reduced due to goods market imperfections since the
firm will not sell immediately. In addition, there is a second indirect eﬀect: since
banks also suﬀer from the reduced future profits of the firm, they will bargain
for higher repayment which further amplifies the eﬀect on firms at the entry
stage.
3.7 Equilibrium in θ and φ and its existence
One can easily plug ρ into the forward values of E1 and B1 to obtain two curves
in the space (θ,φ). These two curves are shifted by all frictions, including by
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goods market frictions. They are determined by the following equations:
(EE) :
c
p(φ)
= (1− β) q(θ)
r + q(θ)
￿
αλ
P − w
r + s
−
￿
γ
q(θ)
r + s+ λ
λ
+Bw
￿￿
(28)
(BB) :
κ
φp(φ)
= β
q(θ)
r + q(θ)
￿
αλ
P − w
r + s
−
￿
γ
q(θ)
r + s+ λ
λ
+Bw
￿￿
(29)
The interpretation of (EE) is the locus of free-entry combinations of (θ,φ) mak-
ing the entry value of firms equal to zero. It is given by a decreasing relation
between φ and θ: a higher θ reduces expected profits and must be compensated
along EE by a less tight credit market for firms. As θ goes to zero, we obtain a
limit denoted by φE
The interpretation of (BB) is the locus of free-entry combinations of (θ,φ)
making the entry value of banks equal to zero. It is given by a increasing relation
between φ and θ: a higher θ reduces expected profits and must be compensated
along BB by a more tight credit market for firms (less tight from the banks’
perspective). As θ goes to zero, we obtain a limit denoted by φB
Property 3 (existence). A necessary condition for existence is that φE >
φB which reflects a condition on profits, entry costs κ and c and the eﬃciency
of matching in the credit market.
Proof: If we denote Λ = P−wr+s −wλ , we have that cp(φE) = (1−β)Λ and κφBp(φB) =
βΠ. Under Cobb-Douglas assumptions p(φ) = p0φ−ε, we have
lnφE =
1
ε
ln[
p0
c
(1− β)Λ]
lnφB = − 1
1− ε ln[
p0
k
βΛ]
The existence condition amounts to lnφE > lnφB that is 1ε ln[
p0
c (1 − β)Λ] >− 11−ε ln[p0k βΛ] or after transformation,
Λ >
￿
k
β
￿ε ￿
c
1−β
￿1−ε
p0
(30)
which states that profits have to be higher than a combination of entry costs weighted
by β and ε and divided by the eﬃciency of the credit matching process p0.
3.8 Special cases
We can easily revert to the special case of perfect goods markets. Unsurprisingly,
the limit case when firms sell instantaneously (that is, when λ→∞) brings us
back to Wasmer and Weil (2004) since αλ → 1 and Bw → 0:
(EE0) :
c
p(φ)
= (1− β) q(θ)
r + q(θ)
￿
P − w
r + s
− γ
q(θ)
￿
(31)
(BB0) :
κ
φp(φ)
= β
q(θ)
r + q(θ)
￿
P − w
r + s
− γ
q(θ)
￿
(32)
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We can also provide notations for the diﬀerent equilibrium values of θ under
diﬀerent assumptions about market imperfections.
• let θ∗ be the equilibrium labor market tightness defined by the combination
of (28) and (29) (general case),
• let θWWg=0 be the Wasmer-Weil limit value of labor market tightness when
goods market frictions disappear, defined by the intersection of (31) and
(32) (no goods market imperfections),
• let θPc,g=0 be the Pissarides limit value of labor market tightness when both
good (λ → ∞) and credit market frictions (c, κ, p go to zero) disappear
(labor constrained economy),
• finally, let θc=0 be the limit value of labor market tightness when only
credit frictions disappear but goods market frictions remain finite: λ ≥ 0
(no credit market imperfections).
Denote by K = cp(φ∗) +
κ
p(φ∗) which is a measure of financial frictions. The
diﬀerent equilibrium values for θ are defined in each case as the implicit solution
of :
(P):
P − w
r + s
=
γ
q(θPc,g=0)
(33)
(WW):
P − w
r + s
=
γ
q(θWWg=0 )
+K
￿
1 +
r
q(θWWg=0 )
￿
(34)
(C0):
￿
αλ
P − w
r + s
−Bw
￿
=
γ
q(θc=0)
￿
1 +
r + s
λ
￿
(ALL):
￿
αλ
P − w
r + s
−Bw
￿
=
γ
q(θ∗)
￿
1 +
r + s
λ
￿
+K
￿
1 +
r
q(θ∗)
￿
(35)
where the left-hand side terms of these equations represent the expected values
of profits of the block constituted from the firm and the bank and the left hand-
side represents the expected costs of labor and credit search. We can rank most
of these values of labor market tightnesses. In particular, the following two
inequalities hold:
θPc,g=0 > θc=0 > θ
∗ (36)
θPc,g=0 > θ
WW
g=0 > θ
∗ (37)
θc=0 ≶ θWWg=0 (38)
The first inequality states that goods market frictions slow down job creation
because firms make less profit due to diﬃculties to sell, and that combining both
frictions (goods and credit) further lowers equilibrium tightness. The second
inequality states that credit market frictions slow down job creation as well
because firms must pay higher entry costs to locate credit. The last line reflects
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Fig. 1: Equilibrium with goods market frictions: free entry of firms (EE) and of
banks (BB)
the fact there is no a priori ranking of labor market tightness in the two polar
cases: perfect credit market and imperfect goods market vs. imperfect credit
market and perfect goods market. There is no way to sign θWc=0 − θWWg=0 in the
general case.
4 The goods markets: consumers and prices
We assume the existence of two consumption goods. The first one is a numeraire
good sold without frictions and produced with no labor and a linear technology
(e.g. the fruits of a Lucas tree but the tree is known to everyone and not
subject to search frictions). The second one is the manufactured good produced
by firms in stage 2 and 3 and subject to search frictions. It is sold at price P : it
is produced by firms and yields 1+Φ units of utility to consumers, with Φ being
strictly positive. It is consumed inelastically, the second unit has marginal value
inferior to its price. Think for instance of a micro-wave, the marginal utility of
owning a second one is close to zero. Hence, at most individual consumers
will consume 1 unit of the good.6 Consistently with the assumption of credit
6 Inelastic consumption of the manufactured good is a useful simplifying assumption. It
makes the price a simpler solution to the Nash program between firms and consumers. In
particular, the assumption implies that the worker’s utility is (negatively) linear in price, and
not in the inverse of price as this would be the case if consumption was equal to income over
price.
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market imperfections, consumers do not save.7 The income is spent into the
manufactured good, what is left is consumed in the numeraire.
4.1 Demand side
We assume that (net) profits are pooled and redistributed to workers as a lump-
sum. Denote B0, V, N2 and N3 respectively the number of banks in stage 0 and
firms in stage 1 (that is, the number of vacancies), 2 (prospecting for consumers)
and 3 (making profits).
The total net flows of profits Π in the economy are given by
Π = −kB0 − γV − wN2 +N3(P − w)
where the first, second and third are the negative cash-flows of the banks, and
N3(P − w) is the net profits of all banks and firms in stage 3. Consumers
therefore receive per person and per period the transfer
T = Π+M
where M is the helicopter drop of money from the Central Bank insuring that
the economy has a positive demand for goods.
The workers can be employed at a wage w or unemployed. The unemployed
have no income except their share of profits and transfer T . We assume that
the good is consumed inelastically at a price P . We further consider a regime
in which
T < P < T + w
which implies that individual consumers can be in one of the 3 stages:
• unemployed, in which case they consume only the numeraire good and
enjoy utility T ;
• employed at a wage w and prospecting for the manufactured good, in that
case they enjoy utility w+T ;
• employed and consuming the manufactured good inelastically, at a price
P ≤ w+T .8 In that case they enjoy utility 1+Φ plus the residual income
w + T − P which has marginal utility 1.
7 It can be shown however that consumers, in this setup, do not necessarily want to save
if they have access to the numeraire. This is because savings does not insure consumption of
the manufactured good with certainty: the presence of search frictions for goods reduces the
value of savings.
8 We recognize that there are alternative specifications to the one studied in the text. One
regime in which T +w < P in which case there is no consumption and therefore a degenerate
economy with only home production. And another, potentially less trivial one, in which P < T
in which the unemployed may consume too, thus crowding out the consumption market We
explore this alternative specification in Section 7.2.
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The Bellman equations describing each of these three stages in a steady-state
are:
rU = T + θq(W0 − U) (39)
rW0 = w + T + η(W1 −W0) + s(U −W0) (40)
rW1 = (w + T − P ) + (1 + Φ) + s(U −W1) (41)
where U is the PDV of being unemployed, W0 the PDV of being employed and
consuming the essential good; W1 the PDV of being employed and consuming
both goods; and η the Poisson rate at which workers find a good to consume.
In the last equation, the first parentheses represent the utility from consuming
w+T−P units of the numeraire, the second parentheses the utility of consuming
one unit of the manufactured good.
We are now in a position to identify τ , the parameter reflecting the de-
struction of the firm-consumer relation. This is actually the outcome of a job
separation from the firm, leading the worker to stop consuming the manufac-
tured good. It follows that τ = s.
Property 4 (Link between labor market and goods market). When
workers’ income generating process is more volatile (higher job destruction s),
consumers are more versatile on the perspective of firms. This destroys consumers-
firms relationships and reduces job creation.
An implication of Property 4 is to give a rationale for policies reducing job
turnover, such as training policies or employment protection, or to raise benefits
for a short period of time after layoﬀ, to preserve consumption relations. This
is not explored here any further but the model is an interesting starting point
for such an analysis.
The other potential consumers are bankers in stage 3: they receive repayment
ρ ; and firms in stage 3: they receive cash-flow P − w − ρ. In the benchmark
case, we do not allow them to consume the manufactured good. We assumed
so far that they are only concerned the utility from consuming the numeraire
which has marginal utility 1. This simplifies a little the exposition of the model.
We relax this assumption in Section 7.1.
4.2 Goods market frictions
Now, we can make explicit the frictions in the goods market. Let MG(C0,N2)
be the number of contacts between C0 unmatched consumers and N2 firms pro-
ducing and attempting to sell their product. We have then
η =
MG(C0,N2)
C0 (42)
λ =
MG(C0,N2)
N2 (43)
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and therefore, the tension on the goods market (from the perspective of workers)
is:
ξ =
C0
N2
the higher ξ, the higher the demand from consumers relative to the production
awaiting to be consumed. The matching properties of the goods market are:
η(ξ) = MG(1, ξ) with η￿(ξ) ≤ 0
λ(ξ) = MG(ξ
−1, ) with λ￿(ξ) ≥ 0
and λ(ξ) = ξη(ξ)
The first equation states that the relative abundance of consumers leads them
to compete more with each other in searching and consuming the good: this
matching rate decreases with their number relative to unmatched firms. The
second equation states that the relative abundance of consumers leads firms
to compete less with each other to sell: this matching rate increases with the
number of unmatched consumers relative to the number of unmatched firms.
Property 5 (block recursiveness 2). Consumption tightness ξ in a steady-
state is equal to 1: C0 ≡ N2.
Proof: Start with some steady-state accounting relating C0, C1 the number of
matched consumers, V the number of firms recruiting workers (e.g. the number of
vacancies), N3 the number of firms matched to a consumer. A more general setup is
provided in Appendix.
dC0
dt
= θq(θ)u− (η + s)C0 = 0
dC1
dt
= ηC0 − sC1 = 0
dN2
dt
= q(θ)V − (λ+ s)N2 = 0
dN3
dt
= λN2 − sN3 = 0
1− u = C0 + C1 = N2 +N3
In steady-state, we thus have
ηC0 = sC1 = θq(θ) η
η + s
u
λN2 = sN3 = q(θ) λ
λ+ s
V
Using
1− u = C0 + C1 = C0
￿
1 +
C1
C0
￿
= C0
￿
1 +
η
s
￿
(44)
1− u = N2 +N3 = N2
￿
1 +
N3
N2
￿
= N2
￿
1 +
λ
s
￿
(45)
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hence
ξ =
C0
N2
=
1 + λs
1 + ηs+η
=
s+ λ(ξ)
s+ η(ξ)
Define
g(ξ) =
s+ λ(ξ)
s+ η(ξ)
Hence, the steady-state consumption tightness is given by the fixed point of function
g(ξ). It happens that this fixed point is 1: indeed, we have
λ(ξ) = ξη(ξ)
and therefore:
g(ξ) =
s+ λ(ξ)
s+ λ(ξ)/ξ
=
s+ ξη(ξ)
s+ η(ξ)
First, g(1) = 1 so 1 is a fixed point. Second, g(ξ) is uniformly increasing in ξ, from 0
to +∞. Finally, it is easy to see that g(ξ) is larger than 1 for ξ > 1 and smaller than
1 for ξ < 1 so that the only strictly positive fixed point is unique.
This property is at first intriguing. It is however very intuitive: this is simply
Say’s law, stating that supply creates its own demand. The law is extended to
stochastic matching on the consumption market. Interestingly, while Say’s law
applies in a neoclassical world only when prices are fully flexible, the property
that goods market tightness is equal to 1 is here true independently of the price
adjustment mechanism.
It is noteworthy that the property depends on the fact that the price of the
good does not aﬀect the search behavior of consumers. If the price aﬀected search
eﬀort for goods, then the tightness of the goods market would necessarily diﬀer
from unity. In Appendix, a calculation of ξ in a more general case is developed,
with various alternative assumptions regarding preferences of consumers. We
show that ξ can always be calculated as a fixed point, and that the only fixed
point that is strictly positive is not necessarily equal to 1 in more general cases.
It is however always a function of parameters. Hence the recursiveness property
of the economy still holds under less specific assumptions about the timing and
separation properties of consumers and firms.
Finally, Property 5 does not hold out of the steady-state. Instead, the in-
teresting dynamics of goods market tightness are discussed in the conclusion of
this paper.
4.3 Price and wage bargaining
We now proceed to the determination of prices and wages. A convenient as-
sumption is to assume, as in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010), that the
firm and bank form a bargaining block, both vis-à-vis the worker and vis-à-vis
the consumer. This reduces complexity of the sequential bargaining game and
avoids complex strategic interactions between firms, banks and workers (and
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here consumers) investigated in Wasmer and Weil (2004) for wage determina-
tion.
The price is here the solution of a bargaining process over the total con-
sumption surplus, with bargaining strength δ and 1 − δ, following the Nash
program:
P = Argmax(W1 −W0)δ(B3 + E3 −B2 − E2)1−δ
where W1 −W0 is the consumer’s surplus.
The determination of wages is potentially more complex, because it requires
further assumptions. Indeed, the wage may be bargained under diﬀerent situa-
tions, it could be negotiated:
• at the entry into the firm, between the unmatched firm (stage 2) and the
worker who is still an unmatched consumer (with value W0)
• at some continuation stage, when the worker/consumer becomes matched
to a goods to consume (with value W0) while the firm is still unmatched
with a consumer (stage 2)
• reciprocally, at some continuation stage, when the worker/consumer is still
unmatched (value W0) but the firm is now matched (stage 3)
• and finally when both the firm is matched to a consumer (stage 3) and its
worker is matched with a good (with value W1).
It is therefore a potentially complicated problem. We will simplify it is assuming
long term contracts: the wage is bargained at the entry stage between the un-
matched worker and the firm. Further, we involve the bank into the bargaining
process, as in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010). We assume the wage to
be the solution of a bargaining process over the total surplus of the firm-bank-
worker in stage 2 of the life of the firm, with bargaining strength α and 1− α.
The wage is therefore not renegotiated in period 3. The wage solves, in period
2:
w = Argmax(W0 − U)α(B2 + E2 −B1 − E1)1−α (46)
Property 6 (Price and wage). The price is a fraction of the marginal
utility of consumption of the manufactured good and increases with goods market
tightness. The wage and price are uniquely determined. Both are independent
of the repayment ρ from the firm to the bank.
Proofs: Price. We have from equation (41):
(r + s)(W1 −W0) = (w − P + 1 + Φ)− rU − (r + s)(W0 − U) (47)
This implies that ∂(W1−W0)∂P =
1
r+s while from equation (4) and (8), we have symmet-
rically:
(r + s+ τ)(B3 + E3 −B2 − E2) = P − w − (r + s)(B2 + E2)
The wage is predetermined, hence its partial derivative with respect to P is equal to
zero.This implies that ∂(B3+E3−B2−E2)∂P =
1
r+s+τ . The bargaining process then leads
to
(1− δ)(r + s)(W1 −W0) = δ(r + s+ τ)(B3 + E3 −B2 − E2)
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Subtracting (41) from (40) we obtain
W1 −W0 = 1 + Φ− P
r + s+ η
and adding up (11) and (12) we have
B3 + E3 −B2 − E2 = P
r + s+ λ+ τ
(48)
leading to a convenient solution for the price:
(1− δ)(1 + Φ− P ) r + s
r + s+ η
= δP
r + s+ τ
r + s+ λ+ τ
or after simplification:
Price: P = 1 + Φ
1 + δ1−δ
r+s+τ
r+s
r+s+η
r+s+λ+τ
(49)
The price is therefore a fraction of the marginal utility of consumption, and varies
with goods market tightness: a higher goods market tightness leads to a higher λ and
therefore firms sell faster, and to a lower η and therefore consumers locate goods at a
slower rate. Therefore, the higher the consumption tightness, the higher the price will
be .
Wage. On the wage side, we have from equation (40):
(r + s)(W0 − U) = w + T + η(W1 −W0)− rU (50)
= w + T − rU + η(1 + Φ− P )
r + s+ η
(51)
This implies ∂(W0−U)∂w =
1
r+s . From equation (3) and (7), we have
(r + s)(B2 + E2) = −w + λ(B3 −B2 + E3 − E2)
= −w + λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
It follows that ∂(B2+E2−B1−E1)∂w =
1
r+s . The solution of the Nash-product for wages
is thus:
α(B2 + E2 −B1 − E1) = (1− α)(W0 − U) (52)
leading to
α
￿
w − λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
+ (r + s)(E1 +B1)
￿
= (1− α)
￿
w + T − rU + η(1 + Φ− P )
r + s+ η
￿
or
w = (1− α)
￿
rU − T − η(1 + Φ− P )
r + s+ η
￿
+ α
￿
λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
− (r + s)(E1 +B1)
￿
This equation has a standard form: the wage is a weighted average of reservation
wage and of future profits. It increases notably with prices, for two reasons: the term
weighted by α reflects future profits from the firm+bank entity, net of their threat
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point (returning to stage 1 with positive surplus value). The term weighted by (1−α)
reflects future consumption of the good when it will be found. The higher that future
price, the lower the consumption of the numeraire, and therefore the lower the gain
from searching for the good thanks to the wage received, leading to a lower surplus
from the worker and thus a need to bargain a higher wage.
Using first the equilibrium value of E1 +B1 as a function of tightness, and second
the value for the reservation wage rU , using
rU = T + θq(θ)(W0 − U) = T + θq(θ)α(r + s+ λ)(B2 + E2)
(1− α)(r + s+ η)
= T + θq(θ)
α(r + s+ λ)
−w+ λr+s+τ+λP
r+s
(1− α)(r + s+ η)
we obtain a solution for the wage, solving:
w = (1− α)
￿
θq(θ) α1−α
r+s+λ
r+s+η
−w+ λr+s+τ+λP
r+s − η(1+Φ−P )r+s+η
￿
(53)
+α
￿
λP
r+s+λ+τ − (r + s)
￿
c
p(φ) +
κ
φp(φ)
￿￿
(54)
which further simplifies moving the wage to the left:
w
￿
1 + α
θq(θ)
r + s
r + s+ λ
r + s+ η
￿
= (1− α)
￿
−η(1 + Φ− P )
r + s+ η
￿
+ α
￿
λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
￿
1 +
r + s+ λ
r + s+ η
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
− (r + s)
￿
c
p(φ)
+
κ
φp(φ)
￿￿
(55)
Finally, using the fact that goods market tightness is equal to 1, we have in equilibrium:
λ = η, leading to a simpler expression for the wage:
Wage: w
￿
1 + α
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
= (1− α)
￿
− η
r + s+ η
(1 + Φ− P )
￿
+ α
￿
λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
￿
1 +
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
− (r + s)
￿
c
p(φ)
+
κ
φp(φ)
￿￿
(56)
The uniqueness of (w,P ) hinges on the fact that the wage equation (56) defines a wage
uniquely defined and depending on P , itself determined through equation (49). This
is another, nested, block-recursiveness property. Existence of a positive solution for
the wage requires a condition on the bargaining power of workers (see Appendix).
Limit cases.
The price can be simplified under a specific case: when consumers have a
very low versatility rate τ , then
P =
1 + Φ
1 + δ1−δ
= (1− δ)(1 + Φ) (57)
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In this specific case, tightness of the goods market does not aﬀect prices because
consumers consume “forever”.
The wage can also be simplified when credit market imperfections disappear:
as c and k jointly converge to zero (no financial frictions), the wage increases
uniformly (as there is less rent to firms and banks in stage1), and the wage is
then solution to
w
￿
1 + α
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
= (1− α)
￿
− η
r + s+ η
(1 + Φ− P )
￿
+α
￿
λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
￿
1 +
θq(θ)
r + s
￿￿
Further, when goods market frictions disappear (η and λ go to infinity), the
wage simplifies to
w
￿
1 + α
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
= −(1− α)(1 + Φ− P ) + α
￿
P
￿
1 +
θq(θ)
r + s
￿￿
or w = P − (1− α)(1 + Φ)
1 + α θq(θ)r+s
(58)
which is equal to the price net of a term going to zero when goods market friction
disappear (competitive wage). The higher the bargaining power of worker α, the
closer the wage to the marginal product. Conversely, the higher the marginal
utility from consumption of the manufactured good, the better the bargaining
position of the (firm+bank) block vis-à-vis the worker and hence, the lower the
price.
4.4 Provisional conclusion: existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium
We have been able to derive the equilibrium in this world with 3 frictional
markets. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition. An equilibrium is a sextuplet (φ, θ, ξ, ρ, w, P ) of market
tightness and prices for each market. The model is solved by two free-entry con-
ditions (banks and firms) and by the equality between the number of consumers
and the number of workers, as well as three equations for "price" determination.
Other relevant quantities (employment, unemployment, vacancies, prospecting
consumers and prospecting firms) are easily derived from the market tightness
variables, from stock-flow conditions and from the assumption of a fixed labor
supply: employment + unemployment = 1.
There is block-recursiveness in the solutions to the model, as follows: φ is
fixed and equal to a simple function of parameters. Independently of the two
other "price" determination rules (for the wage and for the price of the final
good), ξ is also fixed and equal to 1.
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Proposition 1. Under market viability conditions, an equilibrium exists
and is unique.
Proof: Given that price, credit market tightness and goods market tightness are
solved as functions of parameters, the only remaining set of equations relies labor mar-
ket tightness and wages, namely the wage equation (56) and tightness equation (35).
The wage equation positively links labor market tightness and wage. The tightness
equation negatively links them. There is at most one solution in wage and tightness.
The sextuplet (φ, θ, ξ, ρ, w, P ) is thus uniquely determined when it exists.
5 Comparative statics and accelerators
To simplify the exposition of the next part devoted to comparative statics of the
role of goods market frictions, we will now fix w and P . The role of goods market
frictions is simple to study in this context. Having determined that λ = λ(1)
in a steady-state equilibrium in the goods market, we can vary λ exogenously:
e.g., if λ(ξ) = λ0ξ−υ where υ is a parameter, λ(1) = λ0 is a free parameter
that can be varied easily. So hereafter, we simply explore the role of shifts in λ
induced by changes in λ0.
5.1 Comparative statics of goods market imperfections λ−1
An increase in λ causes the right-hand side of the equations (EE) and (BB) to
increase, for a given θ. Hence, both curves are shifted towards the right in the
space (θ,φ): the new equilibrium tightness of the labor market θ is therefore
increased quite strongly. Reducing frictions in the goods markets improves both
the entry of firms and the entry of banks, thus both curves shifts in a direction
that favors job creation.
Here, as Figure 2 illustrates, a rise in λ−1 from 0 (no goods market imperfec-
tions) leads the vertical asymptote to shift leftward and the equilibrium market
tightness is lower as a combination of the eﬀect of the shift of both curves. In-
terestingly, the goods market imperfections also have an impact on the volatility
of θ in response to other shocks. To see this, one can first calculate the slope of
the right-hand side of the equations (EE) and (BB) with respect to θ, given by
(EE) : β
q￿(θ)
(r + q)2
￿
αλr
P − w
r + s
− γ
￿
1 +
r
λ
￿
− rBw
￿
< 0
(BB) : (1− β) q
￿(θ)
(r + q)2
￿
αλr
P − w
r + s
− γ
￿
1 +
r
λ
￿
− rBw
￿
< 0
The sign is negative because q￿ < 0 and the term in brackets must be posi-
tive in any viable markets, otherwise profits by firms would not cover the hir-
ing and wage costs. Inspection of these two equations also reveals that these
slopes in absolute values are closer to zero than in the absence of goods market
imperfections: when λ increases, αλ increases (hence the positive term inside
the bracket is higher), and both negative parts within the bracket Bw and
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Fig. 2: Leftward shifts of EE and BB curves following a lower matching rate in
the goods market λ
γ
￿
1 + rλ
￿
decrease. Hence, denoting by A(λ) the term within the brackets, we
have A(λ) > 0, A￿(λ) > 0, hence the slopes of the two curves are obtained as:
(EE) :
dφ
dθ
=
1− β
−cp￿(φ)
p2(φ)
￿
q￿(θ)
(r + q)2
￿
A(λ) < 0
(BB):
dφ
dθ
=
β
−k(1+φp￿/p)
φ2p(φ)
￿
q￿(θ)
(r + q)2
￿
A(λ) > 0
Property 7 (volatility of θ in response to goods market imperfec-
tion). When the amount of goods market frictions increases (lower λ), A(λ) is
lower, and finally both (EE) and (BB) curves are flatter in ( θ,φ). It follows that
a shock on profit or productivity will have stronger eﬀects of θ∗ than it would
have in the absence of goods market imperfections.
5.2 Multiplier/accelerator
Fixing r = 0 to simplify the analysis, we can calculate a multiplier of profit
shocks.9 Denoting by π = P − w and by ￿x = dx/x the percentage variation of
9 Wasmer and Weil (2004) derived the calculation of a multiplier of profits shocks. Petrosky-
Nadeau and Wasmer (2010) reinterpret the multiplier as a variant of the small surplus assump-
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any variable x , finally by η = −θq￿(θ)/q(θ), we have the following results:
￿θ = 1
η
￿π as in Pissarides (2000) (59)
￿θ = 1 + µWWg=0
η
￿π = 1
η
q(θWWg=0 )
q(θPc,g=0)
￿π in Wasmer-Weil (60)
The quantity µWWg=0 is a variable quantifying the supplementary amplification
of productivity shocks due to the existence of credit market imperfections, in
absence of goods market imperfections. As revealed in equation (60), it is in-
creased by the distance between the tightness of the labor market in a perfect
capital market world (θPc,g=0) and the equilibrium tightness with credit market
imperfections (θWWg=0 ). In Wasmer and Weil (2004), we estimated µg=0 to be
around 0.74 leading productivity shocks to be amplified by a factor 1.74.
The graphical insight of Property 7 can be quantified using the same method-
ology. Denote by µ the multiplier in a three imperfect markets economy. Rewrite
(EE) and (BB) with r = 0. In this case, given Bw = wλ +
w(1−αλ)
s , we have
(EE) :
c
p(φ)
= (1− β)
￿
αλP − w￿
s
− γ
￿
q(θ∗)
￿
(61)
(BB) :
κ
φp(φ)
= β
￿
αλP − w￿
s
− γ
￿
q(θ∗)
￿
(62)
where w￿ = w(1 + s/λ) and γ￿ = γ(1 + s/λ). This implies that the multiplier
can be calculated in the same way as in WW with simply larger labor costs and
larger hiring costs, larger by an amount s/λ that would vanish when λ goes to
infinity. We therefore have:
￿θ = 1
η
(1 + µ)￿π = 1
η
q(θ∗)
q(θPc,g=0)
￿π
=
1
η
q(θ∗)
q(θWWg=0 )
q(θWWg=0 )
q(θPc,g=0)
￿π = 1 + µWWg=0
n
q(θ∗)
q(θWWg=0 )
￿π (63)
In the first line, the only diﬀerence with equation (60) is the top of the right-
hand side: θWWg=0 is replaced by the equilibrium tightness of the model with
three imperfect markets. This implies that there is a multiplier compared to
the volatility of economies in a Pissarides world: q(θ∗)/q(θPg=0) > 1.
The second line simply shows that the multiplier is larger than in the absence
of goods market imperfections due to q(θ∗)/q(θWWg=0 ) > 1.
Property 8. The additional amplification of profit shocks due to goods mar-
ket imperfections, expressed at the ratio of ￿θ in equation (63) to the multiplier
in the absence of goods market frictions in equation ( 60), is at least as large as
the quantity (1 + s/λ) ≥ 1.
tion emphasized in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008): when productive firms are closer to the
margin of creation, productivity changes lead to large entries and exits of vacancies.
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Finally, the next proposition summarizes the discussion:
Proposition 2:
1. Frictions in the goods market 1/λ have no impact on equilibrium credit
market tightness φ∗ nor on equilibrium goods market tightness ξ = 1.
2. Frictions in the goods market 1/λ have a negative impact on equilibrium
labor market tightness θ∗ (with credit frictions) and a negative impact on
the tightness of the labor market θWc=0 (in the absence of credit frictions).
3. Frictions in the goods market 1/λ have a positive impact on the multiplier
µ of the economy defined by ∂ ln θ∗/∂ lnπ = η−1(1 + µ).
6 Numerical exercise
We calibrate the model using the same parameter values as in WW to ease the
comparison: c = k = 0.35, γ = 1.5, β = η = ε = 0.5, P = 1, w = 2/3, r = 5%,
s = 0.15. We then vary credit, labor and goods market frictions . The results
are presented in Table 1.
Labor market→ Some frictions Large frictions
(I) (II)
Hiring time → q
−1
0 = 1/1.5
2 months
q−10 = 1/1.1
￿3 months
"Imperfect Labour Mkt"
Perfect Credit Mkt
Perfect Good Mkt
1/p0 = 0
1/λ = 0
u = 5.56
µ = 0￿θ/￿π = 2
u = 9.86
µ = 0.0￿θ/￿π = 2
"Imperfect Labour Mkt"
Imperfect Credit Mkt
Perfect Good Mkt
1/p0 = 1
1/λ = 0
Credit search takes a year
u = 9.28
µ = 0.74￿θ/￿π = 3.48
u = 16.0
µ = 0.74￿θ/￿π = 3.48
"Imperfect Labour Mkt"
Imperfect Credit Mkt
Imperfect Good Mkt
1/p0 = 1
1/λ = 1/3
Selling time of a quarter
u = 12.3
µ = 1.38￿θ/￿π = 4.75
u = 20.6
µ = 1.38￿θ/￿π = 4.75
"Imperfect Labor Mkt"
Perfect Credit Mkt
Imperfect Good Mkt
1/p0 = 0
1/λ = 1/3
u = 6.72
µ = 0.23￿θ/￿π = 2.45
u = 11.8
µ = 0.23￿θ/￿π = 2.45
Line 1 reveals the role of labor market imperfections in a Pissarides world
with no other frictions: unemployment rises from 5.56 to 9.9 points. Line 2
reveals the amplification role of credit market imperfections. In column (I),
unemployment rises from 5.56 to 9.3% by the moderate credit market frictions,
and would additionally jump to 16% when the two market imperfections (credit
and labor) are combined as incolumn II.
7 Extensions 27
The role of goods market imperfections is underlined in line 3, where we
impose moderate goods market imperfection: assuming λ−1 = 3−1, it takes 4
months to sell the good while the sales (that is, the productive stage of the
firm) lasts on average 1/s = 7 years. In other words, goods market frictions
prevent sales during 5% of the total life time of the firm. In this case, the rate
of unemployment goes up by 2.5 percentage points in column I (moderate labor
frictions), from 9.3 to 12.6 and by 4.6 percentage points in column II (large
labor frictions), from 16 to 20.6%. Further, goods market frictions augment
the unemployment rate and the volatility of the economy quite significantly. By
setting λ to 3, the volatility of the economy ￿θ/￿π which was η−1 = 2 in Pissarides
with rigid wages, and 2 ∗ 1.74 = 3.48 with only credit market imperfections, is
now 2 ∗ (1 + 1.38) = 4.75.
In Line 4, we impose goods market imperfections under perfect credit mar-
kets. The impact of goods market imperfections per se, i.e. independently of
credit imperfections, is relatively modest: the increase in unemployment due to
search frictions in the goods market only is 1.2 percentage point in Column II
(diﬀerence between Line 1 and Line 4) and 1.9 percentage point in Column II
(with larger labor frictions). The multiplier µ is merely 0.22 and ￿θ/￿π = 2.45,
only 22% above the standard Pissarides volatility rate.
The conclusion is that frictions in diﬀerent markets are complements to each
other : for goods market to raise the volatility of the economy, we need credit
market frictions.
7 Extensions
7.1 Extension 1: consumption by bankers and firms
So far we assumed for simplicity that only workers could consume thanks to the
profits of banks and capitalists. We now relax this assumption and let workers,
capitalists and banks to consume the manufactured good. We keep the wage
and P exogenous here to avoid too complex bargaining interactions between
producers in diﬀerent consumption stages and consumers or workers.
For that, we need to change the timing and add a forth state for banks and
firms: the stage in which they have a manufactured good to consume. Let E4
be the value of the firms enjoying the manufactured good. We also assume that,
as all consumers, the firm receives the cash transfer T in the third and forth
states.
Let E0, E1, E2 and E3 the respective steady-state asset values of a firm in
each period. We have:
rE0 = −c+ p(E1 − E0) (64)
rE1 = −γ + γ + q(E2 − E1) (65)
rE2 = −w + w + λ(E3 − E2) + s(E0 − E2) (66)
rE3 = P + T − w − ρ+ s(E0 − E3) + τ(E2 − E3) + η(E4 − E3) (67)
rE4 = (P + T − w − ρ− P ) + (1 + Φ) + s(E0 − E4) + τ(E2 − E4) (68)
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In stage 3, the capitalist has the possibility to search and find a good with
Poisson rate η. The fourth stage allows him to keep an amount T − w − ρ of
unitary good and enjoy the marginal utility of the good 1 + Φ.
The bank’s problem is similar and we have
rB0 = −κ+ φp(B1 −B0) (69)
rB1 = −γ + q(B2 −B1) (70)
rB2 = −w + λ(B3 −B2) + s(B0 −B2) (71)
rB3 = T + ρ+ s(B0 −B3) + τ(B2 −B3) + η(B4 −B3) (72)
rB4 = T + ρ− P + 1 + Φ+ s(B0 −B4) + τ(B2 −B4) (73)
After intermediate steps described in Appendix, we finally obtain the set
of equilibrium conditions determining labor market tightness and credit market
tightness:
(EE4) :
c
p(φ)
=
q(θ)(1− β)
r + q(θ)
￿
αλ
T + P − w +Bη
r + s
−
￿
γ
q(θ)
r + s+ λ
λ
+Bw
￿￿
(BB4) :
κ
φp(φ)
=
q(θ)β
r + q(θ)
￿
αλ
T + P − w +Bη
r + s
−
￿
γ
q(θ)
r + s+ λ
λ
+Bw
￿￿
where the diﬀerence with the benchmark model (equations (28) and (29)) arises
from additional term Bη = η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ . This term reflects the slow transition
for banks and firm to the final consumption stage 4. We still obtain the same
qualitative insights as before, except that these two curves are now shifted right-
wards: since capitalists and bankers can now enjoy more utility through money,
they face higher incentives to enter the market.
We also have more competition for goods from firms and banks consuming,
changing the structure of matching externalities. Indeed, let MG(C,N2) be the
number of contacts between C unmatched consumers and N2 firms producing
and attempting to sell their product. We have now
C = C0 +N3 + B3
and
η =
MG(C,N2)
C (74)
λ =
MG(C,N2)
N2 (75)
and therefore, the new tension in the goods market (on the perspective of con-
sumers) is now:
ξ =
C0 +N3 + B3
N2
the higher ξ, the higher the demand from consumers relative to the production
awaiting to be consumed. The steady-state tightness is the fixed point of a
function h(ξ) described in Appendix. It is still a function of parameters, however
it is not necessarily unique.
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7.2 Extension 2: the unemployed consume
We now relax the hypothesis that stated that the unemployed do not consume
because the transfer T is lower than the price. We now assume instead that
T > P thanks to an appropriate Central Bank drop of money, in this case, the
demand for goods is
C = C0 + u = (1− u− C1) + u = 1− C1
We now have
dC1
dt
= η(1− C1)− sC1 = 0
therefore in a steady-state, we have
C1 = η
s+ η
and therefore the demand for goods
C = s
s+ η
On the other side of the market, we still haveN2. Now, the relevant transition
rates is still
η =
MG(C,N2)
C = η(ξ) with η
￿(ξ) < 0 (76)
and from the benchmark case in equation (45), we still have
N2 = 1− u
1 + λs
Finally, since
1− u = θq(θ)
s+ θq(θ)
we obtain an equality for the consumption tightness
ξ =
C
N2 =
s(s+ θq(θ))
(s+ η(ξ))θq(θ)
= j(ξ, θ)
where the right-hand side, denoted by j(ξ, θ), is such that
∂j
∂ξ
> 0,
∂2j
∂ξ2
< 0,
∂j
∂θ
< 0
The concavity of j insures the uniqueness of the fixed point in consumption
tightness and that fixed point is decreasing in θ: the intuition is that a higher
θ has no impact on demand for consumption as all workers consume, and has
positive impact on the production side.
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8 Conclusion
We have built a model of a multi-frictional economy with imperfections in three
markets. The uniqueness of the equilibrium in the relevant space of three market
tightness (credit, good and labor) is fully preserved. In the main equilibrium,
goods market tightness has to be equal to 1 in a steady state, a generalization
of Say’s law. Since credit market tightness is also a function of entry costs and
bargaining parameters, this implies a full block recursiveness making the model
easy to solve. Finally, the volatility of this economy is significantly increased
via the labor market, due to complementarity between frictions. This raises
volatility by a factor 2 to 3 according to our calibration exercise. This work is
a first attempt to derive a simple search model of a generalized search economy
and its main steady-state properties. It can be developed in three directions.
First, we have a simple setup that allows for a proper calibration of diﬀerent
economies with various degrees of imperfections in diﬀerent markets. A proper
calibration of diﬀerent OECD countries in order to identify the main bottlenecks
to full employment is therefore a natural next step.
Second, alternative timing assumptions may be made. In particular, whether
goods should be produced first or whether consumers should be searched first
depends on the types of good produced and the alternative timing may lead to
interesting insights.
Third, the dynamic properties may provide interesting insights. In a com-
panion paper (Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2011), we precisely investigate
the dynamic implications of an adaptation of the model, with several diﬀerent
features. First, we introduce a consumer search eﬀort which depends on an
arbitrage between costs of eﬀort and returns to eﬀort, itself depending on in-
come. Second, the consumption side is modified: here we assumed that only the
employed workers consume the manufactured good, because transfers to the un-
employed by helicopter drop is insuﬃcient to let them consume this inelastically
supplied good. In Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, we assume instead, following
Merz (1996), that all income is pooled and redistributed to the consumers :
everybody has access to all consumption goods, with however an intensity that
varies with income thanks to the first assumption of endogenous search eﬀort of
consumers. We found in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011) that these spe-
cific goods market frictions drastically change the qualitative and quantitative
dynamics of labor market variables, as compared to the steady-state properties
and notably the size of the multipliers in the steady-state. The main reason is
that amplification arises from the eﬀort made by consumers: after a positive
productivity shocks, firms make more profit, and even though prices fall, they
redistribute more income to consumers. Those in turn will make more eﬀort to
search and therefore will raise the incentives for firms to enter the market. Over-
all this leads to a positive feedback and to a slower return to the equilibrium
path after the shock.
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Appendix
The consumption tightness property in a more general case
There are two types of consumers: those in a firm in stage 2 (without consumer) and
those in a firm in stage 3 (selling its good). Denote them by C2i and C3i for i = 0, 1
with C2i + C3i = Ci, where i is the consumption status: 0 means no consumption of
a manufactured good, 1 means some consumption. In this Appendix, we introduce
some more transitions rates between states. In particular, define τc as the Poisson rate
at which a consumer in consumption state 1 is subject to a taste shock and dislikes
the good he used to consume, and by τf the rate at which a firm selling (in stage 3)
stops being liked by its consumer. Although it seems natural to assume from the start
τf = τc, we keep separate notations to clarify the economics. We have, as represented
on Figure 3, the following relationships:
dC20
dt
= θq(θ)u+ (s+ τc)C21 + (τf + s)C30 − (η + λ+ s)C20 = 0
dC30
dt
= λC20 + (s+ τc)C31 − (η + τf + 2s)C30 = 0
dC21
dt
= ηC20 + (τf + s)C31 − (τc + λ+ 2s)C21 = 0 (77)
dC31
dt
= ηC30 + λC21 − (τc + τf + 2s)C31 = 0
dN2
dt
= θq(θ)u+ (s+ τf )N3 − (λ+ s)N2 = 0
dN3
dt
= λN2 − (2s+ τf )N3 = 0
1− u = C0 + C1 = N2 +N3
To simplify the equations, re-define by a = C20 , b = C30 , c = C21 , d = C31 and
H = θq(θ)u the various unknown above. We then have:
H + (s+ τc)c+ (s+ τf )b = (η + λ+ s)a (78)
λa+ (s+ τc)d = (η + τf + 2s)b (79)
ηa+ (τf + s)d = (τc + λ+ 2s)c (80)
ηb+ λc = (τc + τf + 2s)d (81)
H + (s+ τf )N3 = (λ+ s)N2 (82)
λN2 = (2s+ τf )N3 (83)
The last two equations (82) and (83) give:
λ
2s+ τf
N2 = N3 (84)
H =
￿
(λ+ s)− λ s+ τf
2s+ τf
￿
N2 (85)
or (86)
N2 =
￿
s
λ+ 2s+ τf
2s+ τf
￿−1
H (87)
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Fig. 3: Consumptions patterns under alternative assumptions
Summing up the 4 first equations (78) to (81) we obtain
H = θq(θ)u = s(a+ b+ c) (88)
= s(C30 + C31) + s(C20 + C21)
stating that inflows of consumers (potential and matched with a good) are those coming
from unemployment while outflows are those laid-oﬀ in firms in stage 3 with rate s3
and laid-oﬀ in stage 2 with rate s2.
To calculate goods market tightness, we need to calculate
ξ = C0/N2 = (a+ b)/N2
So, to obtain a+ b, we proceed as follows. First, summing up equations (80) and (81):
η(a+ b) = (τc + s)c+ (τc + s)d (89)
Equation (89) becomes a simpler expression linking a+ b and c+ d, that is the total
of consumers in state 0 and in state 1. This simplification arises from the fact that we
do not need to follow consumers in stage i = 0, 1 in each type of firm 2 or 3 when
c+ d =
η
τc + s
(a+ b) (90)
while, from equation (88):
H = s(a+ b+ c+ d) (91)
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Fig. 4: Consumptions patterns under alternative assumptions
Combining (90) and (91) leads to
a+ b = C0 = H
s
1
1 + ηs+τc
(92)
Goods market tightness is then equal to
ξ =
C0
nN2 =
H
s
1
1+ ηs+τc
￿
λs
s+τf
+ s
￿
H
ξ =
1 + λs+τf
1 + ηs+τc
Returning to the notations λ(ξ) = ξη(ξ), we further obtain
ξ =
ξη(ξ) + s+ τc
η(ξ) + s+ τf
We then see that the level of consumption tightness is a fixed point depending only
on parameters of the matching function MG, of layoﬀ rates and of switching rate and
versatility of consumers. The right-hand side is monotonically increasing in ξ from 0
when ξ = 0 to +∞ when ξ goes to infinity. It follows that the steady-state consumption
tightness is a fixed point. It exists and is a unique solution of parameters:
ξ∗ = ξ∗(MG(.), s, τc, τf )
8 Conclusion 37
To see uniqueness, define
g(ξ) = ξ − ξη(ξ) + s+ τc
η(ξ) + s+ τf
=
(s+ τf )(ξ − 1) + τf − τc
η(ξ) + s+ τf
The denominator is of constant positive sign and the numerator is linear and increasing
in ξ, so there can be at most one zero in g(ξ). This actually determines
ξ∗ = 1 +
τf − τc
s+ τf
Finally, we retrieve the result of the text: to the extent that τf = τc = τ as suggested
as the natural assumption in the beginning of this Appendix section, 1 is the only
fixed point for goods market tightness.
On Properties 7 and 8
The multiplier calculated in Section (5.2) depends on the gap between q(θ∗) and
q(θWWg=0 ) in the absence of frictions in the goods market. We can approximate by how
much it is larger due to goods market frictions, by calculating q(θWWg=0 )/q(θ∗). Using
k
φ∗p(φ∗) =
B1
β with λ
−1 > 0 or (second line) with λ−1 = 0, we have the four cases where
(ALL) means our most general equilibrium, (WW) means no goods market frictions,
(C=0) means no credit market frictions but goods market frictions and finally P is the
Pissarides equilibrium with only labor market frictions. Recall that w￿ = w(1 + s/λ)
and γ￿ = γ(1 + s/λ) defined in Section (5.2), we have:
(ALL) : 1
β
k
φ∗p(φ∗)
= αλ
P − w￿
s
− γ
￿
q(θ∗)
(93)
(WW) : 1
β
k
φ∗p(φ∗)
=
P − w
s
− γ
q(θWWg=0 )
(94)
(P) : 0 = P − w
s
− γ
q(θPc,g=0)
(95)
(C=0): 0 = αλ
P − w
s
− w
￿
s
− γ
￿
q(θc=0)
(96)
or
(ALL) : 1
q(θ∗)
=
αλ P−w
￿
s − 1β kφ∗p(φ∗)
γ￿
(97)
(WW) : 1
q(θWWg=0 )
=
P−w
s − 1β kφ∗p(φ∗)
γ
(98)
(P) : 1
q(θP )
=
P−w
s
γ
(99)
(C=0): 1
q(θc=0)
=
αλ P−w
￿
s
γ￿
(100)
leading to:
q(θWWg=0 )
q(θ∗)
=
γ
γ￿
αλ P−w
￿
s − 1β kφ∗p(φ∗)
P−w
s − 1β kφ∗p(φ∗)
< 1
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The last inequality is the combination of three eﬀects going in the same direction:
with positive search frictions in the goods markets, γ￿ is higher relative to γ, expected
profits are lower due to αλ < 1 and w￿ is higher.
Condition for an equilibrium with positive price and wage
The price is always positive thanks to equation (49). The wage rewrite as:
w
￿
1 + α
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
= (1− α) (−aη(1 + Φ− P ))
+ α
￿
aλP
￿
1 +
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
− (r + s)K
￿
(101)
where K =
￿
c
p(φ) +
κ
φp(φ)
￿
; aη = ηr+s+η ; aλ =
λ
r+s+λ+τ .A = (1− δ)(1 + Φ). Note first
that 1+Φ−P is positive given the price equation. Second, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a positive wage is
1− α
α
(aη(1 + Φ− P )) + (r + s)K ≤ aλP
￿
1 +
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
(102)
which requires: suﬃcently small search frictions in the financial sector (low K) and a
suﬃciently large bargaining power of worker α. Interestingly, for all values of K and
for the other parameters, there always exists a value of α which insure that condition
(102) is satisfied.
Appendix to Section 7
Firms and banks consume: Section 7.1.
Diﬀerencing the expression for rB4 and for rB3, we obtain first
B4 −B3 = 1 + Φ− P
r + s+ η + τ
The same procedures on the firm’s side leads to
E4 − E3 = 1 + Φ− P
r + s+ η + τ
Then, diﬀerencing the expression for rB3 and for rB2, we obtain
B3 −B2 = T + ρ+ w + η(B4 −B3)
r + s+ λ+ τ
=
T + ρ+ w + η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
r + s+ λ+ τ
and similarly for firms,
E3 − E2 = T + P − w − ρ+ η(E4 − E3)
r + s+ λ+ τ
=
T + P − w − ρ+ η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
r + s+ λ+ τ
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Then, we have
B1 =
−γ + qB2
r + q
=
−γ + qB2
r + q
(r + s)B2 = −w + λ(B3 −B2) = −w + λ
T + ρ+ w + η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
r + s+ λ+ τ
therefore : B1 =
−γ + qB2
r + q
=
−γ + q−w+λ
T+ρ+w+η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
r+s+λ+τ
r+s
r + q
and similarly,
E1 =
q
λ
T+P−w−ρ+η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
r+s+λ+τ
r+s
r + q
We therefore find ρ as the solution of
E1β = B1(1− β)
which leads to￿
−γ(r + s) + q
￿
−w + αλ
￿
T + ρ+ w + η
1 + Φ− P
r + s+ η + τ
￿￿￿
(1− β)
= βqαλ
￿
T + P − w − ρ+ η 1 + Φ− P
r + s+ η + τ
￿
or
αλρ
r + s
= βαλ
￿
T + P − w + η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
r + s
￿
+(1−β)
γ
q
+
￿
w + αλ
￿
T + w + η 1+Φ−Pr+s+η+τ
￿￿
r + s

From here, we easily obtain the new (EE4) and (BB4) in the text. To obtain an
expression for goods market tightness, we proceed as follows. First, notice that we
still have:
η(ξ) = MG(1, ξ) with η￿(ξ) ≤ 0
λ(ξ) = MG(ξ
−1, ) with λ￿(ξ) ≥ 0
and λ(ξ) = ξη(ξ)
Second, we need to calculate N3 and B3, knowing that for i = 2, 3, 4, we have
Ni = Bi. Focusing only on firms and workers, we have:
dC0
dt
= θq(θ)u− (η + s)C0 = 0
dC1
dt
= ηC0 − sC1 = 0
dN2
dt
= q(θ)V − (λ+ s)N2 + τN3 + τN4 = 0
dN3
dt
= λN2 − (s+ λ+ τ + η)N3 = 0
dN4
dt
= ηN3 − (s+ τ)N4
1− u = C0 + C1 = N2 +N3 +N4
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Hence, we have
N4 = η
s+ τ
N3
N3 = λ
s+ λ+ τ + η
N2
q(θ)V = (λ+ s)N2 + τN3 + τ η
s+ τ
N3
Going back to ξ, and using N3 ≡ B3, we have
ξ =
C0 +N3 + B3
N2
=
C0
N2 +
2λ
s+ λ+ τ + η
Using
1− u = C0 + C1 = C0
￿
1 +
C1
C0
￿
= C0
￿
1 +
η
s
￿
1− u = N2 +N3 +N4 = N2
￿
1 +
λ
s+ λ+ τ + η
+
η
s+ τ
λ
s+ λ+ τ + η
￿
hence
ξ =
1 + λs+λ+τ+η +
η
s+τ
λ
s+λ+τ+η
1 + ηs
+
2λ
s+ λ+ τ + η
=
1
s+ λ+ τ + η
￿
s+ 4λ+ τ + η +
ηλ
s+ τ
+ 2
ηλ
s
￿
Define now
h(ξ) =
1
s+ λ(ξ) + τ + η(ξ)
￿
s+ 4λ(ξ) + τ + η(ξ) +
η(ξ)λ(ξ)
s+ τ
+ 2
η(ξ)λ(ξ)
s
￿
The solution to the fixed point problem h(ξ) = ξ is therefore only a function of
parameters. The fixed point may not be unique.
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Technical Appendix: Summary of the main equations of the benchmark model
rE0 = −c+ p(E1 − E0) (103)
rE1 = −γ + γ + q(E2 − E1) (104)
rE2 = −w + w + λ(E3 − E2) + s(E0 − E2) (105)
rE3 = P − w − ρ+ s(E0 − E3) + τ(E2 − E3) (106)
rB0 = −κ+ φp(B1 −B0) (107)
rB1 = −γ + q(B2 −B1) (108)
rB2 = −w + λ(B3 −B2) + s(B0 −B2) (109)
rB3 = ρ+ s(B0 −B3) + τ(B2 −B3) (110)
Useful intermediate steps: by diﬀerence of E3 and E2
(E3 − E2)(r + λ+ τ + s) = P − w − ρ (111)
(B3 −B2)(r + λ+ τ + s) = ρ+ w (112)
αλ =
r + s+ λ
r + s+ λ+ τ
Free-entry equations:
B1 =
κ
φp(φ)
; (113)
E1 =
c
p(φ)
; (114)
B3 =
ραλ − w(1− αλ)
r + s
; (115)
E3 = αλ
P − w − ρ
r + s
(116)
and recursively,
B2 =
1
r + s+ λ
[−w + λB3] ; (117)
E2 =
1
r + s+ λ
[0 + λE3] ; (118)
B1 =
1
r + q(θ)
[−γ + qB2] ; (119)
E1 =
1
r + q(θ)
[0 + qE2] . (120)
rU = T + θq(W0 − U) (121)
rW0 = w + T + η(W1 −W0) + s(U −W0) (122)
rW1 = (w + T − P ) + (1 + Φ) + s(U −W1) (123)
φ∗ =
1− β
β
κ
c
(124)
Bw =
w
λ
+
w(1− αλ)
r + s
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The price
P = Argmax(W1 −W0)δ(B3 + E3 −B2 − E2)1−δ
leads to
P =
1 + Φ
1 + δ1−δ
r+s+τ
r+s
r+s+η
r+s+λ+τ
(125)
The wage
w = Argmax(W0 − U)α(B2 + E2 −B1 − E1)1−α (126)
leads to
w
￿
1 + α
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
= (1− α)
￿
− η
r + s+ η
(1 + Φ− P )
￿
+ α
￿
λP
r + s+ λ+ τ
￿
1 +
θq(θ)
r + s
￿
− (r + s)
￿
c
p(φ)
+
κ
φp(φ)
￿￿
(127)
